literary transcript

 

 

Part Five

 

Thought at the Meridian

 

Rebellion and Murder

 

*

 

       Far from this source of life, however, Europe and the revolution are being shaken to the core by a spectacular convulsion.  During the last century, man cast off the fetters of religion.  Hardly was he free, however, when he created new and utterly intolerable chains.  Virtue dies but is born again, more exacting than ever.  It preaches an ear-splitting sermon on charity to all comers and a kind of love for the future which makes a mockery of contemporary humanism.  When it has reached this point of stability, it can only wreak havoc.  A day arrives when it becomes bitter, immediately adopts police methods, and, for the salvation of mankind, assumes the ignoble aspect of an inquisition.  At the climax of contemporary tragedy, we therefore become intimates of crime.  The sources of life and of creation seem exhausted.  Fear paralyzes a Europe peopled with phantoms and machines.  Between two holocausts, scaffolds are installed in underground caverns where humanist executioners celebrate their new cult in silence.  What cry would ever trouble them?  The poets themselves, confronted with the murder of their fellow men, proudly declare that their hands are clean.  The whole world absentmindedly turns its back on these crimes; the victims have reached the extremity of their disgrace: they are a bore.  In ancient times the blood of murder at least produced a religious horror and in this way sanctified the value of life.  The real condemnation of the period we live in is, on the contrary, that it leads us to think that it is not bloodthirsty enough.  Blood is no longer visible; it does not bespatter the faces of our pharisees visibly enough.  This is the extreme of nihilism; blind and savage murder becomes an oasis and the imbecile criminal seems positively refreshing in comparison with our highly intelligent executioners.

       Having believed for a long time that it could fight against God with all humanity as its ally, the European mind then perceived that it must also, if it did not want to die, fight against men.  The rebels who, united against death, wanted to construct, on the foundation of the human species, a savage immortality are terrified at the prospect of being obliged to kill in their turn.  Nevertheless, if they retreat they must accept death; if they advance they must accept murder.  Rebellion, cut off from its origins and cynically travestied, oscillates, on all levels, between sacrifice and murder.  The form of justice that it advocated and that it hoped was impartial has turned out to be summary.  The kingdom of grace has been conquered, but the kingdom of justice is crumbling too.  Europe is dying of this disappointing realization.  Rebellion pleaded for the innocence of mankind, and now it has hardened its heart against its own culpability.  Hardly does it start off in search of totality when it receives as its portion the most desperate sensations of solitude.  It wanted to enter into communion with mankind and now it has no other hope but to assemble, one by one, throughout the years, the solitary men who fight their way toward unity.

       Must we therefore renounce every kind of rebellion, whether we accept, with all its injustices, a society that outlives its usefulness, or whether we decide, cynically, to serve, against the interest of man, the inexorable advance of history?  After all, if the logic of our reflection should lead to a cowardly conformism it would have to be accepted as certain families sometimes accept inevitable dishonour.  If it must also justify all the varieties of attempts against man, and even his systematic destruction, it would be necessary to consent to his suicide.  The desire for justice would finally realize its ambition: the disappearance of a world of tradesmen and police.

       But are we still living in a rebellious world?  Has not rebellion become, on the contrary, the excuse of a new variety of tyrant?  Can the “We are” contained in the movement of rebellion, without shame and without subterfuge, be reconciled with murder?  In assigning oppression a limit within which begins the dignity common to all men, rebellion defined a primary value.  It put in the first rank of its frame of reference an obvious complicity among men, a common texture, the solidarity of chains, a communication between human being and human being which makes men both similar and united.  In this way, it compelled the mind to take a first step in defiance of an absurd world.  By this progress it rendered still more acute the problem that it must now solve in regard to murder.  On the level of the absurd, in fact, murder would only give rise to logical contradictions; on the level of rebellion it is mental laceration.  For it is now a question of deciding whether it is possible to kill someone whose resemblance to ourselves we have at last recognized and whose identity we have just sanctified.  When we have only just conquered solitude, must we then re-establish it definitively by legitimizing the act that isolates everything?  To force solitude on a man who has just come to understand that he is not alone, is that not the definitive crime against man?

       Logically, one should reply that murder and rebellion are contradictory.  If a single master should, in fact, be killed, the rebel, in a certain way, is no longer justified in using the terms community of men from which he derived his justification.  If this world has no higher meaning, if man is only responsible to man, it suffices for a man to remove one single human being from the society of the living to automatically exclude himself from it.  When Cain kills Abel, he flees to the desert.  And if murderers are legion, then this legion lives in the desert and in that other kind of solitude called promiscuity.

       From the moment that he strikes, the rebel cuts the world in two.  He rebelled in the name of the identity of man with man and he sacrifices this identity by consecrating the difference in blood.  His only existence, in the midst of suffering and oppression, was contained in this identity.  The same movement, which intended to affirm him, thus brings an end to his existence.  He can claim that some, or even almost all, are with him.  But if one single human being is missing in the irreplaceable world of fraternity, then this world is immediately depopulated.  If we are not, then I am not and this explains the infinite sadness of Kaliayev and the silence of Saint-Just.  The rebels, who have decided to gain their ends through violence and murder, have in vain replaced, in order to preserve the hope of existing, “We are” by the “We shall be.”  When the murderer and the victim have disappeared, the community will provide its own justification without them.  The exception having lasted its appointed time, the rule will once more become possible.  On the level of history, as in individual life, murder is thus a desperate exception or it is nothing.  The disturbance that it brings to the order of things offers no hope of a future; it is an exception and therefore it can be neither utilitarian nor systematic as the purely historical attitude would have it.  It is the limit that can be reached but once, after which one must die.  The rebel has only one way of reconciling himself with his act of murder if he allows himself to be led into performing it: to accept his own death and sacrifice.  He kills and dies so that it shall be clear that murder is impossible.  He demonstrates that, in reality, he prefers the “We are” to the “We shall be.”  The calm happiness of Kaliayev in his prison, the serenity of Saint-Just when he walks toward the scaffold, are explained in their turn.  Beyond that farthest frontier, contradiction and nihilism begin.

 

 

       Nihilistic Murder

 

       Irrational crime and rational crime, in fact, both equally betray the value brought to light by the movement of rebellion.  Let us first consider the former.  He who denies everything and assumes the authority to kill – Sade, the homicidal dandy, the pitiless Unique, Karamazov, the zealous supporters of the unleashed bandit – lay claim to nothing short of total freedom and the unlimited display of human pride.  Nihilism confounds creator and created in the same blind fury.  Suppressing every principle of hope, it rejects the idea of any limit, and in blind indignation, which no longer is even aware of its reasons, ends with the conclusion that it is a matter of indifference to kill when the victim is already condemned to death.

       But its reasons – the mutual recognition of a common destiny and the communication of men between themselves – are always valid.  Rebellion proclaimed them and undertook to serve them.  In the same way it defined, in contradiction to nihilism, a rule of conduct that has no need to await the end of history to explain its actions and which is, nevertheless, not formal.  Contrary to Jacobin morality, it made allowances for everything that escapes from rules and laws.  It opened the way to a morality which, far from obeying abstract principles, discovers them only in the heat of battle and in the incessant movement of contradiction.  Nothing justifies the assertion that these principles have existed externally; it is of no use to declare that they will one day exist.  With us, and throughout all history, they deny servitude, falsehood, and terror.

       There is, in fact, nothing in common between a master and a slave; it is impossible to speak and communicate with a person who has been reduced to servitude.  Instead of the implicit and untrammelled dialogue through which we come to recognize our similarity and consecrate our destiny, servitude gives sway to the most terrible of silences.  If injustice is bad for the rebel, it is not because it contradicts an eternal idea of justice, but because it perpetuates the silent hostility that separates the oppressor from the oppressed.  It kills the small part of existence that can be realized on this earth through the mutual understanding of men.  In the same way, since the man who lies shuts himself off from other men, falsehood is therefore proscribed and, on a slightly lower level, murder and violence, which impose definitive silence.  The mutual understanding and communication discovered by rebellion can survive only in the free exchange of conversation.  Every ambiguity, every misunderstanding, leads to death; clear language and simple words are the only salvation from this death. [It is worth noting that the language peculiar to totalitarian doctrines is always a scholastic or administrative language.] The climax of every tragedy lies in the deafness of its heroes.  Plato is right and not Moses and Nietzsche.  Dialogue on the level of mankind is less costly than the gospel preached by totalitarian regimes in the form of a monologue dictated from the top of a lonely mountain.  On the stage as in reality, the monologue precedes death.  Every rebel, solely by the movement that sets him in opposition to the oppressor, therefore pleads for life, undertakes to struggle against servitude, falsehood, and terror, and affirms, in a flash, that these three afflictions are the cause of silence between men, that they obscure them from one another and prevent them from rediscovering themselves in the only value that can save them from nihilism – the long complicity of men at grips with their destiny.

       In a flash – but that is time enough to say, provisionally, that the most extreme form of freedom, the freedom to kill, is not compatible with the sense of rebellion.  Rebellion is in no way the demand for total freedom.  On the contrary, rebellion puts total freedom up for trial.  It specifically attacks the unlimited power that authorizes a superior to violate the forbidden frontier.  Far from demanding general independence, the rebel wants it to be recognized that freedom has its limits everywhere that a human being is to be found – the limit being precisely that human being’s power to rebel.  The most profound reason for rebellious intransigence is to be found here.  The more aware rebellion is of demanding a just limit, the more inflexible it becomes.  The rebel undoubtedly demands a certain degree of freedom for himself; but in no case, if he is consistent, does he demand the right to destroy the existence and the freedom of others.  He humiliates no one.  The freedom he claims, he claims for all; the freedom he refuses, he forbids everyone to enjoy.  He is not only the slave against the master, but also man against the world of master and slave.  Therefore, thanks to rebellion, there is something more in history than the relation between mastery and servitude.  Unlimited power is not the only law.  It is in the name of another value that the rebel affirms the impossibility of total freedom while he claims for himself the relative freedom necessary to recognize this impossibility.  Every human freedom, at its very roots, is therefore relative.  Absolute freedom, which is the freedom to kill, is the only one which does not claim, at the same time as itself, the things that limit and obliterate it.  Thus it cuts itself off from its roots and – abstract and malevolent shade – wanders haphazardly until such time as it imagines that it has found substance in some ideology.

       It is then possible to say that rebellion, when it develops into destruction, is illogical.  Claiming the unity of the human condition, it is a force of life, not of death.  Its most profound logic is not the logic of destruction; it is the logic of creation.  Its movement, in order to remain authentic, must never abandon any of the terms of the contradiction that sustains it.  It must be faithful to the yes that it contains as well as to the no that nihilistic interpretations isolate in rebellion.  The logic of the rebel is to want to serve justice so as not to add to the injustice of the human condition, to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood, and to wager, in spite of human misery, for happiness.  Nihilistic passion, adding to falsehood and injustice, destroys in its fury its original demands and thus deprives rebellion of its most cogent reasons.  It kills in the fond conviction that this world is dedicated to death.  The consequence of rebellion, on the contrary, is to refuse to legitimize murder because rebellion, in principle, is a protest against death.

       But in man were capable of introducing unity into the world entirely on his own, if he could establish the reign, by his own decree, of sincerity, innocence, and justice, he would be God Himself.  Equally, if he could accomplish all this, there would be no more reasons for rebellion.  If rebellion exists, it is because falsehood, injustice, and violence are part of the rebel’s condition.  He cannot, therefore, absolutely claim not to kill or lie, without renouncing his rebellion and accepting, once and for all, evil and murder.  But no more can he agree to kill and lie, since the inverse reasoning which would justify murder and violence would also destroy the reasons for his insurrection.  Thus the rebel can never find peace.  He knows what is good and, despite himself, does evil.  The value that supports him is never given to him once and for all; he must fight to uphold it, unceasingly.  Again the existence he achieves collapses if rebellion does not support it.  In any case, if he is not always able not to kill, either directly or indirectly, he can put his conviction and passion to work at diminishing the chances of murder around him.  His only virtue will lie in never yielding to the impulse to allow himself to be engulfed in the shadows that surround him and in obstinately dragging the chains of evil, with which he is bound, toward the light of good.  If he finally kills himself, he will accept death.  Faithful to his origins, the rebel demonstrates by sacrifice that his real freedom is not freedom from murder but freedom from his own death.  At the same time, he achieves honour in metaphysical terms.  Thus Kaliayev climbs the gallows and visibly designates to all his fellow men the exact limit where man’s honour begins and ends.

 

 

       Historical Murder

 

       Rebellion also deploys itself in history, which demands not only exemplary choices, but also efficacious attitudes.  Rational murder runs the risk of finding itself justified by history.  The contradiction of rebellion, then, is reflected in an apparently insoluble contradiction, of which the two counterparts in politics are on the one hand the opposition between violence and non-violence, and on the other hand the opposition between justice and freedom.  Let us try to define them in the terms of their paradox.

       The positive value contained in the initial movement of rebellion supposes the renunciation of violence committed on principle.  It consequently entails the impossibility of stabilizing a revolution.  Rebellion is, incessantly, prey to this contradiction.  On the level of history it becomes even more insoluble.  If I renounce the project of making human identity respected, I abdicate in favour of oppression, I renounce rebellion and fall back on an attitude of nihilistic consent.  Then nihilism becomes conservative.  If I insist that human identity should be recognized as existing, then I engage in an action which, to succeed, supposes a cynical attitude toward violence and denies this identity and rebellion itself.  To extend the contradiction still farther, if the unity of the world cannot come from on high, man must construct it on his own level, in history.  History without a value to transfigure it, is controlled by the law of expediency.  Historical materialism, determinism, violence, negation of every form of freedom which does not coincide with expediency and the world of courage and of silence, are the highly legitimate consequences of a pure philosophy of history.  In the world today, only a philosophy of eternity could justify non-violence.  To absolute worship of history and of the historical situation it would ask whence it had sprung.  Finally, it would put the responsibility for justice in God’s hands, thus consecrating injustice.  Equally, its answers, in their turn, would insist on faith.  The objection will be raised of evil, and of the paradox of an all-powerful and malevolent, or benevolent and sterile, God.  The choice will remain open between grace and history, God or the sword.

       What, then, should be the attitude of the rebel?  He cannot turn away from the world and from history without denying the very principle of his rebellion, nor can he choose eternal life without resigning himself, in one sense, to evil.  If, for example, he is not a Christian, he should go to the bitter end.  But to the bitter end means to choose history absolutely and with it murder, if murder is essential to history: to accept the justification of murder is again to deny his origins.  If the rebel makes no choice, he chooses the silence and slavery of others.  If, in a moment of despair, he declares that he opts both against God and against history, he is the witness of pure freedom; in other words, of nothing.  In our period of history and in the impossible condition in which he finds himself, of being unable to affirm a superior motive that does not have its limits in evil, his apparent dilemma is silence or murder – in either case, a surrender.

       And it is the same again with justice and freedom.  These two demands are already to be found at the beginning of the movement of rebellion and are to be found again in the first impetus of revolution.  The history of revolutions demonstrates, however, that they almost always conflict as though their mutual demands were irreconcilable.  Absolute freedom is the right of the strongest to dominate.  Therefore it prolongs the conflicts that profit by injustice.  Absolute justice is achieved by the suppression of all contradiction: therefore it destroys freedom. [In his Entretiens sur le bon usage de la liberté (Conversations on the Good Use of Freedom), Jean Grenier lays the foundation for an argument that can be summed up thus: absolute freedom is the destruction of all value; absolute value suppresses all freedom.  Likewise Palante: “If there is a single and universal truth, freedom has no reason for existing.”]  The revolution to achieve justice, through freedom, ends by aligning them against each other.  Thus there exists in every revolution, once the class that dominated up to then has been liquidated, a stage in which it gives birth, itself, to a movement of rebellion which indicates its limits and announces its chances of failure.  The revolution, first of all, proposes to satisfy the spirit of rebellion which has given rise to it; then it is compelled to deny it, the better to affirm itself.  There is, it would seem, an ineradicable opposition between the movement of rebellion and the attainments of revolution.

       But these contradictions only exist in the absolute.  They suppose a world and a method of thought without meditation.  There is, in fact, no conciliation possible between a god who is totally separated from history and a history purged of all transcendence.  Their representatives on earth are, indeed, the yogi and the commissar.  But the difference between these two types of men is not, as has been stated, the difference between ineffectual purity and expediency.  The former chooses only the ineffectiveness of abstention and the second the ineffectiveness of destruction.  Because both reject the conciliatory value that rebellion, on the contrary, reveals, they offer us only two kinds of impotence, both equally removed from reality, that of good and that of evil.

       If, in fact, to ignore history comes to the same as denying reality, it is still alienating oneself from reality to consider history as a completely self-sufficient absolute.  The revolution of the twentieth century believes that it can avoid nihilism and remain faithful to true rebellion, by replacing God by history.  In reality, it fortifies the former and betrays the latter.  History in its pure form furnishes no value by itself.  Therefore one must live by the principles of immediate expediency and keep silent or tell lies.  Systematic violence, or imposed silence, calculation or concerted falsehood become the inevitable rule.  Purely historical thought is therefore nihilistic: it wholeheartedly accepts the evil of history and in this way is opposed to rebellion.  It is useless for it to affirm, in compensation, the absolute rationality of history, for historical reason will never be fulfilled and will never have its full meaning or value until the end of history.  In the meanwhile, it is necessary to act, and to act without a moral rule in order that the definitive rule should one day be realized.  Cynicism as a political attitude is only logical as a function of absolutist thought; in other words, absolute nihilism on the one hand, absolute rationalism on the other. [We see again, and this cannot be said too often, that absolute rationalism is not rationalism.  The difference between the two is the same as the difference between cynicism and realism.  The first drives the second beyond the limits that give it meaning and legitimacy.  More brutal, it is finally less efficacious.  It is violence opposed to force.]  As for the consequences, there is no difference between the two attitudes.  From the moment that they are accepted, the earth becomes a desert.

       In reality, the purely historical absolute is not even conceivable.  Jaspers’s thought, for example, in its essentials, underlines the impossibility of man’s grasping totality, since he lives in the midst of this totality.  History, as an entirety, could exist only in the eyes of an observer outside it and outside the world.  History only exists, in the final analysis, for God.  Thus it is impossible to act according to plans embracing the totality of universal history.  Any historical enterprise can therefore only be a more or less reasonable or justifiable adventure.  It is primarily a risk.  Insofar as it is a risk it cannot be used to justify any excess or any ruthless and absolutist position.

       If, on the other hand, rebellion could found a philosophy it would be a philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance, and of risk.  He who does not know everything cannot kill everything.  The rebel, far from making an absolute of history, rejects and disputes it, in the name of a concept that he has of his own nature.  He refuses his condition, and his condition to a large extent is historical.  Injustice, the transience of time, death – all are manifest in history.  In spurning them, history itself is spurned.  Most certainly the rebel does not deny the history that surrounds him; it is in terms of this that he attempts to affirm himself.  But confronted with it, he feels like the artist confronted with reality; he spurns it without escaping from it.  He had never succeeded in creating an absolute history.  Even though he can participate, by the force of events, in the crime of history, he cannot necessarily legitimate it.  Rational crime not only cannot be admitted on the level of rebellion, but also signifies the death of rebellion.  To make this evidence more convincing, rational crime exercises itself, in the first place, on rebels whose insurrection contests a history that is henceforth deified.

       The mystification peculiar to the mind which claims to be revolutionary today sums up and increases bourgeois mystification.  It contrives, by the promise of absolute justice, the acceptance of perpetual injustice, of unlimited compromise, and of indignity.  Rebellion itself only aspires to the relative and can only promise an assured dignity coupled with relative justice.  It supposes a limit at which the community of man is established.  Its universe is the universe of relative values.  Instead of saying, with Hegel and Marx, that all is necessary, it only repeats that all is possible and that, at a certain point of the farthest frontier, it is worth making the supreme sacrifice for the sake of the possible.  Between God and history, the yogi and the commissar, it opens a difficult path where contradictions may exist and thrive.  Let us consider the two contradictions given as an example in this way.

       A revolutionary action which wishes to be coherent in terms of its origins should be embodied in an active consent to the relative.  Uncompromising as to its means, it would accept an approximation as far as its ends are concerned and, so that the approximation should become more and more accurately defined, it would allow absolute freedom of speech.  Thus it would preserve the common existence that justifies its insurrection.  In particular, it would preserve as an absolute law the permanent possibility of self-expression.  This defines a particular line of conduct in regard to justice and freedom.  There is no justice in society without natural or civil rights as its basis.  There are no rights without expression of those rights.  If the rights are expressed without hesitation it is more than probable that, sooner or later, the justice they postulate will come to the world.  To conquer existence, we must start from the small amount of existence we find in ourselves and not deny it from the very beginning.  To silence the law until justice is established is to silence it forever since it will have no more occasion to speak if justice reigns forever.  Once more, we thus confide justice into the keeping of those who alone have the ability to make themselves heard – those in power.  For centuries, justice and existence as dispensed by those in power have been considered a favour.  To kill freedom in order to establish the reign of justice comes to the same as resuscitating the idea of grace without divine intercession and of restoring by a mystifying reaction the mystic body in its basest elements.  Even when justice is not realized, freedom preserves the power to protest and guarantees human communication.  Justice in a silent world, justice enslaved and mute, destroys mutual complicity and finally can no longer be justice.  The revolution of the twentieth century has arbitrarily separated, for overambitious ends of conquest, two inseparable ideas.  Absolute freedom mocks at justice.  Absolute justice denies freedom.  To be fruitful, the two ideas must find their limits in each other.  No man considers that his condition is free if it is not at the same time just, nor just unless it is free.  Freedom, precisely, cannot even be imagined without the power of saying clearly what is just and what is unjust, of claiming all existence in the name of a small part of existence which refuses to die.  Finally there is a justice, though a very different kind of justice, in restoring freedom, which is the only imperishable value of history.  Men are never really willing to die except for the sake of freedom: therefore they do not believe in dying completely.

       The same reasoning can be applied to violence.  Absolute non-violence is the negative basis of slavery and its acts of violence; systematic violence positively destroys the living community and the existence we receive from it.  To be fruitful, these two ideas must establish final limits.  In history, considered as an absolute, violence finds itself legitimized; as a relative risk, it is the cause of a rupture in communication.  It must therefore preserve, for the rebel, its provisional character of effraction and must always be bound, if it cannot be avoided, to a personal responsibility and to an immediate risk.  Systematic violence is part of the order of things; in a certain sense, this is consolatory.  Führerprinzip or historical Reason, whatever order may establish it, it reigns over the universe of things, not the universe of men.  Just as the rebel considers murder as the limit that he must, if he is so inclined, consecrate by his own death, so violence can only be an extreme limit which combats another form of violence, as, for example, in the case of an insurrection.  If an excess of injustice renders the latter inevitable, the rebel rejects violence in advance, in the service of a doctrine or of a reason of State.  Every historical crisis, for example, terminates in institutions.  If we have no control over the crisis itself, which is pure hazard, we do have control over the institutions, since we can define them, choose the ones for which we will fight, and thus bend our effort toward their establishment.  Authentic arts of rebellion will only consent to take up arms for institutions that limit violence, not for those which codify it.  A revolution is not worth dying for unless it assumes the immediate suppression of the death penalty; not worth going to prison for unless it refuses in advance to pass sentence without fixed terms.  If rebel violence employs itself in the establishment of these institutions, announcing its aims as often as it can, it is the only way in which it can be really provisional.  When the end is absolute, historically speaking, and when it is believed certain of realization, it is possible to go so far as to sacrifice others.  When it is not, only oneself can be sacrificed, in the hazards of a struggle for the common dignity of man.  Does the end justify the means?  That is possible.  But what will justify the end?  To that question, which historical thought leaves pending, rebellion replies: the means.

       What does such an attitude signify in politics?  And, first of all, is it efficacious?  We must answer without hesitation that it is the only attitude that is efficacious today.  There are two sorts of efficacy: that of typhoons and that of sap.  Historical absolutism is not efficacious, it is efficient; it has seized and kept power.  Once it is in possession of power, it destroys the only creative reality.  Uncompromising and limited action, springing from rebellion, upholds this reality and only tries to extend it farther and farther.  It is not said that this action cannot conquer.  It is said that it runs the risk of not conquering and of dying.  But either revolution will take this risk or it will confess that it is only the undertaking of a new set of masters, punishable by the same scorn.  A revolution that is separated from honour betrays its origins that belong to the reign of honour.  Its choice, in any case, is limited to material expediency and final annihilation, or to risks and hence to creation.  The revolutionaries of the past went ahead as fast as they could and their optimism was complete.  But today the revolutionary spirit has grown in knowledge and clear-sightedness; it has behind it a hundred and fifty years of experience.  Moreover, the revolution has lost its illusions of being a public holiday.  It is, entirely on its own, a prodigious and calculated enterprise, which embraces the entire universe.  It knows, even though it does not always say so, that it will be world-wide or that it will not be at all.  Its chances are balanced against the risk of a universal war, which, even in the event of victory, will only present it with an Empire of ruins.  It can remain faithful to its nihilism, and incarnate in the charnel houses the ultimate reason of history.  Then it will be necessary to renounce everything except the silent music that will again transfigure the terrestrial hell.  But the revolutionary spirit in Europe can also, for the first and last time, reflect upon its principles, ask itself what the deviation is which leads it into terror and into war, and rediscover with the reasons for its rebellion, its faith in itself.

 

 

 

Moderation and Excess

 

*

 

       The errors of contemporary revolution are first of all explained by the ignorance or systematic misconception of that limit which seems inseparable from human nature and which rebellion reveals.  Nihilist thought, because it neglects this frontier, ends by precipitating itself into a uniformly accelerated movement.  Nothing any longer checks it in its course and it reaches the point of justifying total destruction or unlimited conquest.  We now know, at the end of this long inquiry into rebellion and nihilism, that rebellion with no other limits but historical expediency signifies unlimited slavery.  To escape this fate, the revolutionary mind, if it wants to remain alive, must therefore return again to the sources of rebellion and draw its inspiration from the only system of thought which is faithful to its origins: thought that recognizes limits.  If the limit discovered by rebellion transfigures everything, if every thought, every action that goes beyond a certain point negates itself, there is, in fact, a measure by which to judge events and men.  In history, as in psychology, rebellion is an irregular pendulum, which swings in an erratic arc because it is looking for its most perfect and profound rhythm.  But its irregularity is not total: it functions around a pivot.  Rebellion, at the same time that it suggests a nature common to all men, brings to light the measure and the limit which are the very principle of this nature.

       Every reflection today, whether nihilist or positivist, gives birth, sometimes without knowing it, to standards that science itself confirms.  The quantum theory, relativity, the uncertainty of interrelationships, define a world that has no definable reality except on the scale of average greatness, which is our own.  The ideologies which guide our world were born in the time of absolute scientific discoveries.  Our real knowledge, on the other hand, only justifies a system of thought based on relative discoveries.  “Intelligence,” says Lazare Bickel, “is our faculty for not developing what we think to the very end, so that we can still believe in reality.”  Approximative thought is the only creator of reality. [Science today betrays its origins and denies its own acquisitions in allowing itself to be put to the service of State terrorism and the desire for power.  Its punishment and its degradation lie in only being able to produce, in an abstract world, the means of destruction and enslavement.  But when the limit is reached, science will perhaps serve the individual rebellion.  This terrible necessity will mark the decisive turning-point.]

       The very forces of matter, in their blind advance, impose their own limits.  That is why it is useless to want to reverse the advance of technology.  The age of the spinning-wheel is over and the dream of a civilization of artisans is vain.  The machine is bad only in the way that it is now employed.  Its benefits must be accepted even if its ravages are rejected.  The truck, driven day and night, does not humiliate its driver, who knows it inside out and treats it with affection and efficiency.  The real and inhuman excess lies in the division of labour.  But by dint of this excess, a day comes when a machine capable of a hundred operations, operated by one man, creates one sole object.  This man, on a different scale, will have partially rediscovered the power of creation which he possessed in the days of the artisan.  The anonymous producer then more nearly approaches the creator.  It is not certain, naturally, that industrial excess will immediately embark on this path.  But it already demonstrates, by the way it functions, the necessity for moderation and gives rise to reflections on the proper way to organize this moderation.  Either this value of limitation will be realized, or contemporary excesses will only find their principle and peace in universal destruction.

       This law of moderation equally well extends to all the contradictions of rebellious thought.  The real is not entirely rational, nor is the rational entirely real.  As we have seen in regard to surrealism, the desire for unity not only demands that everything should be rational.  It also wishes that the irrational should not be sacrificed.  One cannot say that nothing has any meaning, because in doing so one affirms a value sanctioned by an opinion; not that everything has a meaning, because the word everything has no meaning for us.  The irrational imposes limits on the rational, which, in its turn, gives it its moderation.  Something has a meaning, finally, which we must obtain from meaninglessness.  In the same way, it cannot be said that existence takes place only on the level of essence.  Where could one perceive essence except on the level of existence and evolution?  But nor can it be said that being is only existence.  Something that is always in the process of development could not exist – there must be a beginning.  Being can only prove itself in development, and development is nothing without being.  The world is not in a condition of pure stability; nor is it only movement.  It is both movement and stability. The historical dialectic, for example, is not in continuous pursuit of an unknown value.  It revolves around the limit, which is its prime value.  Heraclitus, the discoverer of the constant change of things, nevertheless set a limit to this perpetual process.  This limit was symbolized by Nemesis, the goddess of moderation and the implacable enemy of the immoderate.  A process of thought which wanted to take into account the contemporary contradictions of rebellion should seek its inspiration from this goddess.

       As for the moral contradictions, they too begin to become soluble in the light of this conciliatory value.  Virtue cannot separate itself from reality without becoming a principle of evil.  Nor can it identify itself completely with reality without denying itself.  The moral value brought to light by rebellion, finally, is no farther above life and history than history and life are above it.  In actual truth, it assumes no reality in history until man gives his life for it or dedicates himself entirely to it.  Jacobin and bourgeois civilization presumes that values are above history, and its formal virtues then lay the foundation of a repugnant form of mystification.  The revolution of the twentieth century decrees that values are intermingled with the movement of history and that their historical foundation justify a new form of mystification.  Moderation, confronted with this irregularity, teaches us that at least one part of realism is necessary to every ethic: pure and unadulterated virtue is homicidal.  And one part of ethics is necessary to all realism: cynicism is homicidal.  That is why humanitarian cant has no more basis than cynical provocation.  Finally, man is not entirely to blame; it was not he who started history; nor is he entirely innocent, since he continues it.  Those who go beyond this limit and affirm his total innocence end in the insanity of definitive culpability.  Rebellion, on the contrary, sets us on the path of calculated culpability.  Its sole but invincible hope is incarnated, in the final analysis, in innocent murderers.

       At this limit, the “We are” paradoxically defines a new form of individualism.  “We are” in terms of history, and history must reckon with this “We are,” which must in its turn keep its place in history.  I have need of others who have need of me and of each other.  Every collective action, every form of society, supposes a discipline, and the individual, without this discipline, is only a stranger, bowed down under the weight of an inimical collectivity.  But society and discipline lose their direction if they deny the “We are.”  I alone, in one sense, support the common dignity that I cannot allow either myself or others to debase.  This individualism is in no sense pleasure; it is perpetual struggle, and, sometimes, unparalleled joy when it reaches the heights of proud compassion.

 

 

       Thought at the Meridian

 

       As for knowing if such an attitude can find expression in the contemporary world, it is easy to evoke – and this is only an example – what is traditionally called revolutionary trade-unionism.  Cannot it be said that even this trade-unionism is ineffectual?  The answer is simple: it is this movement alone that, in one century, is responsible for the enormously improved condition of the workers from the sixteen-hour day to the forty-hour week.  The ideological Empire has turned socialism back on its tracks and destroyed the greater part of the conquests of trade-unionism.  It is because trade-unionism started from a concrete basis, the basis of professional employment (which is to the economic order what the commune is to the political order), the living cell on which the organism builds itself, while the Cæsarian revolution starts from doctrine and forcibly introduces reality into it.  Trade-unionism, like the commune, is the negation, to the benefit of reality, of bureaucratic and abstract centralism. [Tolain, the future Communard, wrote: “Human beings emancipate themselves only on the basis of natural groups.”]  The revolution of the twentieth century, on the contrary, claims to base itself on economics, but is primarily political and ideological.  It cannot, by its very function, avoid terror and violence done to the real.  Despite its pretensions, it begins in the absolute and attempts to mould reality.  Rebellion, inversely, relies on reality to assist it in its perpetual struggle for truth.  The former tries to realize itself from top to bottom, the latter from bottom to top.  Far from being a form of romanticism, rebellion, on the contrary, takes the part of true realism.  If it wants a revolution, it wants it on behalf of life, not in defiance of it.  That is why it relies primarily on the most concrete realities – on occupation, on the village, where the living heart of things and of men is to be found.  Politics, to satisfy the demands of rebellion, must submit to the eternal verities.  Finally, when it causes history to advance and alleviates the sufferings of mankind, it does so without terror, if not without violence, and in the most dissimilar political conditions. [Scandinavian societies today, to give only one example, demonstrate how artificial and destructive are purely political opposites.  The most fruitful form of trade-unionism is reconciled with constitutional monarchy and achieves an approximation of a just society.  The first preoccupation of the historical and natural State has been, on the contrary, to crush forever the professional nucleus and communal autonomy.]

       But this example goes farther than it seems.  On the very day when the Cæsarian revolution triumphed over the syndicalist and libertarian spirit, revolutionary thought lost, in itself, a counterpoise of which it cannot, without decaying, deprive itself.  This counterpoise, the spirit which takes the measure of life, is the same that animates the long tradition that can be called solitary thought, in which, since the time of the Greeks, nature has always been weighed against evolution.  The history of the First International, when German Socialism ceaselessly fought against the libertarian thought of the French, the Spanish, and the Italians, is the history of the struggle of German ideology against the Mediterranean mind. [See Marx’s letter to Engels (July 20, 1870) hoping for the victory of Prussia over France: “The preponderance of the German proletariat would be at the same time the preponderance of our theory over Proudhon’s.]  The commune against the State, concrete society against absolutist society, deliberate freedom against rational tyranny, finally altruistic individualism against the colonization of the masses, are, then, the contradictions that express once again the endless opposition of moderation to excess which has animated the history of the Occident since the time of the ancient world.  The profound conflict of this century is perhaps not so much between the German ideologies of history and Christian political concepts, which in a certain way are accomplices, as between German dreams and Mediterranean traditions, between the violence of eternal adolescence and virile strength, between nostalgia, rendered more acute by knowledge and by books and courage reinforced and enlightened by the experience of life – in other words, between history and nature.  But German ideology, in this sense, has come into its inheritance.  It consummates twenty centuries of abortive struggle against nature, first in the name of a historic god and then of a deified history.  Christianity, no doubt, was only able to conquer its catholicity by assimilating as much as it could of Greek thought.  But when the Church dissipated its Mediterranean heritage, it placed the emphasis on history to the detriment of nature, caused the Gothic to triumph over the romance, and, destroying a limit in itself, has made increasing claims to temporal power and historical dynamism.  When nature ceases to be an object of contemplation and admiration, it can then be nothing more than material for an action that aims at transforming it.  These tendencies – and not the concepts of mediation, which would have comprised the real strength of Christianity – are triumphing in modern times, to the detriment of Christianity itself, by an inevitable turn of events.  That God should, in fact, be expelled from this historical universe and German ideology be born where action is no longer a process of perfection but pure conquest, is an expression of tyranny.

       But historical absolutism, despite its triumphs, has never ceased to come into collision with an irrepressible demand of human nature, of which the Mediterranean, where intelligence is ultimately related to the blinding light of the sun, guards the secret.  Rebellious thought, that of the commune and of revolutionary trade-unionism, has not ceased to deny this demand in the presence of bourgeois nihilism as well as of Cæsarian socialism.  Authoritarian thought, by means of three wars and thanks to the physical destruction of a revolutionary elite, has succeeded in submerging this libertarian tradition.  But this barren victory is only provisional; the battle still continues.  Europe has never been free of this struggle between darkness and light.  It has only degraded itself by deserting the struggle and eclipsing day by night.  The destruction of this equilibrium is today bearing its bitterest fruits.  Deprived of our means of mediation, exiled from natural beauty, we are once again in the world of the Old Testament, crushed between a cruel Pharaoh and an implacable heaven.

       In the common condition of misery, the eternal demand is heard again; nature once more takes up the fight against history.  Naturally, it is not a question of despising anything, or of exalting one civilization at the expense of another, but of simply saying that it is a thought which the world today cannot do without for very much longer.  There is, undoubtedly, in the Russian people something to inspire Europe with the potency of sacrifice, and in America a necessary power of construction.  But the youth of the world always find themselves standing on the same shore.  Thrown into the unworthy melting-pot of Europe, deprived of beauty and friendship, we Mediterraneans, the proudest of races, live always by the same light.  In the depths of the European night, solar thought, the civilization facing two ways awaits its dawn.  But it already illuminates the paths of real mastery.

       Real mastery consists in refuting the prejudices of the time, initially the deepest and most malignant of them, which would reduce man, after his deliverance from excess, to a barren wisdom.  It is very true that excess can be a form of sanctity when it is paid for by the madness of Nietzsche.  But in this intoxication of the soul which is exhibited on the scene of our culture always the madness of excess, the folly of attempting the impossible, of which the brand can never be removed from him who has, once at least, abandoned himself to it?  Has Prometheus ever had this fanatical or accusing aspect?  No, our civilization survives in the complacency of cowardly or malignant minds – a sacrifice to the vanity of aging adolescents.  Lucifer also has died with God, and from his ashes has arisen a spiteful demon who does not even understand the object of his venture.  In 1950, excess is always a comfort, and sometimes a career.  Moderation, on the one hand, is nothing but pure tension.  It smiles, no doubt, and our Convulsionists, dedicated to elaborate apocalypses, despise it.  But its smile shines brightly at the climax of an interminable effort: it is in itself a supplementary source of strength.  Why do these petty-minded Europeans who show us an avaricious face, if they no longer have the strength to smile, claim that their desperate convulsions are examples of superiority?

       The real madness of excess dies or creates its own moderation.  It does not cause the death of others in order to create an alibi for itself.  In its most extreme manifestations, it finds its limit, on which, like Kaliayev, it sacrifices itself if necessary.  Moderation is not the opposite of rebellion.  Rebellion in itself is moderation, and it demands, defends, and re-creates it throughout history and its eternal disturbances.  The very origin of this value guarantees us that it can only be partially destroyed.  Moderation, born of rebellion, can only live by rebellion.  It is a perpetual conflict, continually created and mastered by the intelligence.  It does not triumph either in the impossible or in the abyss.  It finds its equilibrium through them.  Whatever we may do, excess will always keep its place in the heart of man, in the place where solitude is found.  We all carry within us our places of exile, our crimes and our ravages.  But our task is not to unleash them on the world; it is to fight them in ourselves and in others.  Rebellion, the secular will not to surrender of which Barrès speaks, is still today at the basis of the struggle.  Origin of form, source of real life, it keeps us always erect in the savage, formless movement of history.

 

 

 

Beyond Nihilism

 

*

 

       There does exist for man, therefore, a way of acting and of thinking which is possible on the level of moderation to which he belongs.  Every undertaking that is more ambitious than this proves to be contradiction.  The absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history.  Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the Inquisition.  How would society define an absolute?  Perhaps everyone is looking for this absolute on behalf of all.  But society and politics only have the responsibility of arranging everyone’s affairs so that each will have the leisure and the freedom to pursue this common search.  History can then no longer be presented as an object of worship.  It is only an opportunity that must be rendered fruitful by a vigilant rebellion.

       “Obsession with the harvest and indifference to history,” writes René Char admirably, “are two extremities of my bow.”  If the duration of history is not synonymous with the duration of the harvest, then history, in effect, is no more than a fleeting and cruel shadow in which man has no more part.  He who dedicates himself to this history dedicates himself to nothing and, in his turn, is nothing.  But he who dedicates himself to the duration of his life, to the house he builds, to the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself to the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again.  Finally, it is those who know how to rebel, at the appropriate moment, against history who really advance its interests.  To rebel against it supposes an interminable tension and the agonized serenity of which René Char also speaks.  But the true life is present in the heart of the dichotomy.  Life is this dichotomy itself, the mind soaring over volcanoes of light, the madness of justice, the extenuating intransigence of moderation.  The words that reverberate for us at the confines of this long adventure of rebellion are not formulas for optimism, for which we have no possible us in the extremities of our unhappiness, but words of courage and intelligence which, on the shores of the eternal seas, even have the qualities of virtue.

       No possible form of wisdom today can claim to give more.  Rebellion indefatigably confronts evil, from which it can only derive a new impetus.  Man can master in himself everything that should be mastered.  He should rectify in creation everything that can be rectified.  And after he has done so, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society.  Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world.  But the injustice and the suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.  Dimitri Karamazov’s cry of “Why?” will continue to resound; art and rebellion will die only with the last man.

       There is an evil, undoubtedly, which men accumulate in their fantastic desire for unity.  But yet another evil lies at the roots of this inordinate movement.  Confronted with this evil, confronted with death, man from the very depths of his soul cries out for justice.  Historical Christianity has only replied to this protest against evil by the annunciation of the kingdom and then of eternal life, which demands faith.  But suffering exhausts hope and faith and then is left alone and unexplained.  The toiling masses, worn out with suffering and death, are masses without God.  Our place is henceforth at their side, far from teachers, old and new.  Historical Christianity postpones to a point beyond the span of history the cure of evil and murder, which are nevertheless experienced within the span of history.  Contemporary materialism also believes that it can answer all questions.  But, as a slave to history, it increases the domain of historic murder and at the same time leaves it without any justification, except in the future – which again demands faith.  In both cases one must wait, and meanwhile the innocent continue to die.  For twenty centuries the sum total of evil has not diminished in the world.  No paradise, whether divine or revolutionary, has been realized.  An injustice remains inextricably bound to all suffering, even the most deserved in the eyes of men.  The long silence of Prometheus before the powers that overwhelmed him still cries out in protest.  But Prometheus, meanwhile, has seen men rail and turn against him.  Crushed between human evil and destiny, between terror and the arbitrary, all that remains to him is his power to rebel in order to save from murder him who can still be saved, without surrendering to the arrogance of blasphemy.

       Then we understand that rebellion cannot exist without a strange form of love.  Those who find no rest in God or in history are condemned to live for those who, like themselves, cannot live: in fact, for the humiliated.  The most pure form of the movement of rebellion is thus crowned with the heart-rending cry of Karamazov: if all are not saved, what good is the salvation of only one?  Thus Catholic prisoners, in the prison cells of Spain, refuse communion today because the priests of the regime have made it obligatory in certain prisons.  These lonely witnesses to the crucifixion of innocence also refuse salvation if it must be paid for by injustice and oppression.  This insane generosity is the generosity of rebellion, which unhesitatingly gives the strength of its love and without a moment’s delay refuses injustice.  Its merit lies in making no calculations, distributing everything it possesses to life and to living men.  It is thus that it is prodigal in its gifts to men to come.  Real generosity toward the future lies in giving all to the present.

       Rebellion proves in this way that it is the very movement of life and that it cannot be denied without renouncing life.  Its purest outburst, on each occasion, gives birth to existence.  Thus it is love and fecundity or it is nothing at all.  Revolution without honour, calculated revolution which, in preferring an abstract concept of man to a man of flesh and blood, denies existence as many times as is necessary, puts resentment in the place of love.  Immediately rebellion, forgetful of its generous origins, allows itself to be contaminated by resentment; it denies life, dashes toward destruction, and raises up the grimacing cohorts of petty rebels, embryo slaves all of them, who end by offering themselves for salve, today, in all the marketplaces of Europe, to no matter what form of servitude.  It is no longer either revolution or rebellion but rancour, malice, and tyranny.  Then, when revolution in the name of power and of history becomes a murderous and immoderate mechanism, a new rebellion is consecrated in the name of moderation and of life.  We are at that extremity now.  At the end of this tunnel of darkness, however, there is inevitably a light, which we already divine and for which we only have to fight to ensure its coming.  All of us, among the ruins, are preparing a renaissance beyond the limits of nihilism.  But few of us know it.

 

       Already, in fact, rebellion, without claiming to solve everything, can at least confront its problems.  From this moment high noon is borne away on the fast-moving stream of history.  Around the devouring flames, shadows writhe in mortal combat for an instant of time and then as suddenly disappear, and the blind, fingering their eyelids, cry out that this is history.  The men of Europe, abandoned to the shadows, have turned their backs upon the fixed and radiant point of the present.  They forget the present for the future, the fate of humanity for the delusion of power, the misery of the slums for the mirage of the eternal city, ordinary justice for an empty promised land.  They despair of personal freedom and dream of a strange freedom of the species; reject solitary death and give the name of immortality to a vast collective agony.  They no longer believe in the things that exist in the world and in living man; the secret of Europe is that it no longer loves life.  Its blind men entertain the puerile belief that to love one single day of life amounts to justifying whole centuries of oppression.  That is why they wanted to efface joy from the world and to postpone it until a much later date.  Impatience with limits, the rejection of their double life, despair at being a man, have finally driven them to inhuman excesses.  Denying the real grandeur of life, they have had to stake all on their own excellence.  For want of something better to do, they deified themselves and their misfortunes began; these gods have had their eyes put out.  Kaliayev, and his brothers throughout the entire world, refuse, on the contrary, to be deified in that they refuse the unlimited power to inflict death.  They choose, and give us as an example the only original rule of life today: to learn to live and to die, and, in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god.

       At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.  We shall choose Ithaca, the faithful land, frugal and audacious thought, lucid action, and the generosity of the man who understands.  In the light, the earth remains our first and our last love.  Our brothers are breathing under the same sky as we; justice is a living thing.  Now is born that strange joy which helps one live and die, and which we shall never again postpone to a later time.  On the sorrowing earth it is the unresting thorn, the bitter brew, the harsh wind off the sea, the old and the new dawn.  With this joy, through long struggle, we shall remake the soul of our time, and a Europe which will exclude nothing.  Not even that phantom Nietzsche, who for twelve years after his downfall was continually invoked by the West as the blasted image of its loftiest knowledge and its nihilism; nor the prophet of justice without mercy who lies, by mistake, in the unbelievers’ plot at Highgate Cemetery; nor the deified mummy of the man of action in his glass coffin; nor any part of what the intelligence and energy of Europe have ceaselessly furnished to the pride of a contemptible period.  All may indeed live again, side by side with the martyrs of 1905, but on condition that it is understood that they correct one another, and that a limit, under the sun, shall curb them all.  Each tells the other that he is not God; this is the end of romanticism.  At this moment, when each of us must fit an arrow to his bow and enter the lists anew, to reconquer, within history and in spite of it, that which he owns already, the thin yield of the fields, the brief love of this earth, at this moment when at last a man is born, it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies.  The bow bends; the wood complains.  At the moment of supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and free.