201. Put analogically, one could argue that the supersession of worldly will by diabolic will is equivalent to electric fires superseding electric cookers, while the analogical equivalence for divine consciousness is electric light, which towers above both fires and cookers alike, shining at a quasi-spiritual remove from soulful and wilful orders of heat. Yet before the victory of light over heat, the victory of diabolic heat over worldly heat, of positive emotions over positive sensations, in order that one kind of will be eclipsed by another in the progression of will from the body to the head. For denying bodily will through the affirmation of head will is a step in the direction of liberation from the will through divine consciousness, albeit an indirect step, and one which those who support it would probably regard in a definitive light, as though an end-in-itself. The fact that it is not such an end ... is an article of divine judgement, and, while from a divine standpoint, emotional and intellectual will may be superior, because of the brain, to sensational and physical will, nevertheless it is manifestly inferior to the pure feelings and consciousness which accrue to the affirmation of positive being. Will is ever connected with the realm of doing ... whether for others, as in the context of positive worldly will, or for self, as in the context of positive diabolic will, and until doing is denied, there can be no true being, the being-for-self which is the ultimate positive affirmation because the definitive morality - supermonotheistic in character.
202. Thus whilst a People's democracy is preferable to a bourgeois democracy because symptomatic of a more elevated order of will, it can only be morally inferior to a People's theocracy, which is less a question of will than of consciousness, less a question of soulful heat than of spiritual light, and therefore less a question of eternal damnation than of eternal salvation. For whereas a bourgeois democracy is purgatorial, since of the world, a People's democracy is hellish, since aligned with a soulful survival of the body. It is not a means to a higher end, i.e. a People's theocracy, but an end-in-itself and, consequently, a kind of eternity. Only a People's theocracy can be heavenly, since aligned with a spiritual survival of the body, and such a survival is the will-less salvation which is commensurate with the true eternity of Heaven. Thus in the event of the world 'dying', i.e. being overcome, the two positive eternities of communistic soul and centristic spirit will co-exist on a bipolar supra-national planet for centuries to come, in fact until such time as Heaven finally comes to terms with Hell, and the spiritual eternity vanquishes the soulful eternity in the name of global unification - the material precondition of ultimate spiritual unity achieved on a truly divine basis.
1. proton-wavicle being against self 8. electron-wavicle being for self
2. proton-particle doing against self 7. electron-particle doing for others
3. atomic proton doing against others 6. atomic electron doing for others
4. proton-biased atomic being against others 5. electron-biased atomic being for others
203. Regarding the above-mentioned devolutionary and evolutionary options, it becomes clear that whereas 'self', whether in the contexts of being or doing, pertains to the proton and electron absolutes, 'others', whether in the contexts of being or doing, pertain to atomic relativities, so that while the former is either divine or diabolic, the latter is inherently worldly. In other words, reference to 'self' puts being and doing on the plane of God and Devil (whether in regard to the alpha or to the omega alternatives), whereas reference to 'others' puts being and doing on the plane of the world (whether in terms of materialism or realism, pantheism or atheism).
204. Thus, bearing this in mind, one can list the aforementioned options as follows:-
1. proton-wavicle being against self 8. electron-wavicle being for self
2. proton-particle doing against self 7. electron-particle doing for self
3. atomic proton-particle doing against others 6. atomic electron-particle doing for others
4. proton-biased atomic-wavicle being against others 5. electron-biased atomic-wavicle being for others
with, in the case of (1) and (8), an alpha and omega divine antithesis; in the case of (2) and (7) an alpha and omega diabolic antithesis; in the case of (3) and (6) a worldly alpha and worldly omega antithesis; and in the case of (4) and (5) an alpha worldly and omega worldly antithesis. With wavicles one has being, with particles doing. With protons one has reaction against, with electrons ... attraction towards. Proton-wavicle absolutism is accordingly being against self, proton-particle absolutism ... doing against self. Electron-wavicle absolutism is accordingly being for self, electron-particle absolutism ... doing for self. Reaction and attraction, against and for, or, as one could also say, active and passive, bearing in mind the reactive nature of action and the attractive nature of passivity - doing and being. Similarly, atomic proton-particle relativity is doing against others, proton-biased atomic-wavicle relativity ... being against others. Electron-biased atomic-wavicle relativity is being for others, atomic electron-particle relativity ... doing for others. Thus with wavicles one is either in the sphere of morality or, as in the case of the alpha worldly and omega worldly antithesis, in that of amorality, whereas with particles one is in the sphere of immorality, whether on worldly or diabolic terms.
205. All being is in space, whereas all doing is in time. For space is no less correlative of being than time ... of doing. There is divine space and worldly space, diabolic time and worldly time, both negatively and positively. On the one hand, devolutionary space and time, and, on the other hand, evolutionary space and time; the one preceding the other on an alternate basis, starting on the devolutionary plane with negative diabolic time as the effect of negative divine space, and ending on the evolutionary plane with positive diabolic time as the cause of positive divine space, due worldly causes and effects coming in-between. For whereas effects succeed causes when space is at issue, causes precede effects when time is at issue, though in the world such a procedure is less absolute than relative. Consequently we may speak of negative diabolic time as the effect of negative divine space but negative worldly time as the effective cause of negative worldly space on the one hand, and of positive worldly time as the causative effect of positive worldly space but positive diabolic time as the cause of positive divine space on the other hand. Otherwise we would fall into the illogical trap of accrediting space, and hence being, with directly causative properties when, in point of fact, being of a negative order, i.e. alpha and worldly, can only be indirectly responsible for doing of a negative order, which, whether diabolic or worldly, finds its correlation in time - the direct cause of being, whether negative or positive.
206. Hence a distinction between cause and effect where the divine and diabolic absolutes are concerned, but a distinction between effective causes and causative effects where the worldly relativities are at issue, as in the devolutionary regression from negative worldly time to negative worldly space, the former the effective cause of the latter, and also as in the evolutionary progression from positive worldly space to positive worldly time, the latter the causative effect of the former. Thus as against alpha worldly relativity, negative diabolic time is the effect of negative divine space (the apparent cause), whereas as against - or beyond - omega worldly relativity, positive diabolic time is the cause of positive divine space (the essential effect). Therefore whereas negative divine space is merely the apparent cause of negative diabolic time, positive divine space is the essential effect of positive diabolic time. Alpha and omega, protons and electrons, centrifugal and centripetal, reactions and attractions. In the alpha case, a space-time continuum leading to worldly time/space; in the omega case, a time-space continuum results from worldly space/time. Alpha outer space and outer time, negative worldly time and worldly space; positive worldly space and worldly time, omega inner time and inner space.
207. Outer space and time have reference to self, to a self with a subconscious/old-brain bias or, more correctly, to selves with either a subconscious bias or an old-brain bias, depending on the type of alpha 'self' in question; negative worldly time and space have reference to others, to others with a blood/bone bodily bias or, more correctly, with either a blood bias or a bone bias, depending on the type of negative worldly 'other' in question. Positive worldly space and time have reference to others, to others with a flesh/muscle bodily bias or, more correctly, with either a flesh bias or a muscle bias, depending on the type of positive worldly 'other' in question; inner time and space have reference to self, to a self with a new-brain/superconscious bias or, more correctly, to selves with either a new-brain bias or a superconscious bias, depending on the type of omega 'self' in question.
208. Put in the form of our familiar devolutionary/evolutionary diagram, we could say:-
1. being against self in negative divine space 8. being for self in positive divine space
2. doing against self in negative diabolic time 7. doing for self in positive diabolic time
3. doing against others in negative worldly time 6. doing for others in positive worldly time
4. being against others in negative worldly space 5. being for others in positive worldly space
Additionally, we should also note that while both negative worldly time and space on the one hand and positive worldly space and time on the other hand are in the world, and therefore neither strictly outer nor inner, alpha nor omega, the negative pair constitute a relative outer in relation to the relatively inner nature of the succeeding positive pair.
209. Space and time are thus either inner or outer, depending on the type of space and time in question. In the world they are relatively inner and outer, before the world they are absolutely outer and beyond it they are absolutely inner. Outer space and time are only intelligible within the context of proton absolutism, in contrast to inner space and time which are synonymous with electron absolutism. In between, we find the worldly space and time which is both outer and inner, protons and electrons, in an atomic compromise. Space as we ordinarily understand it, i.e. cosmic space and the gaps between objects, pertains to the world, albeit more in terms of a neutron void than an atomic compromise.
210. Similarly, when consciousness is equated with a void, or nothingness (neant), as by Sartre, we have a neutron position in between protons on the one hand (old brain/subconscious) and electrons on the other (new brain/superconscious), which is symptomatic of bourgeois decadence. By contrast, proletarian consciousness (light), when properly 'turned on', is an electron being in superconscious space, whereas proletarian motion (heat) is an electron doing in new-brain time, the difference, in other words, between wavicles and particles, divine and diabolic, white- and blue-collar alternatives. Such superbeing and superdoing are dependent on and motivated by artificial phenomena (superphenomena) of an electronic bias, whether in optical or aural terms. On the other hand, worldly being and doing are motivated by natural phenomena of an atomic constitution, whether in optical or aural terms, and stand between the transcendental orders of (super)being and (super)doing and the traditional, alpha-stemming orders of (sub)being and (sub)doing motivated by natural noumena of a proton bias. For whereas the superphenomenal is a precondition, or cause, of the supernoumenal, the phenomenal stems from a noumenal precondition and may accordingly be described as its causative effect.
211. As against being in space, of whatever order, we have doing in time of whatever order, and whereas being accords with binding - indeed, is inseparable from binding - to a centre, doing accords with freedom from a centre, be it alpha or worldly. To be free is to do in time; to be bound is to be in space. If I am free to do, I am not bound to be. If I am bound to be, I am not free to do. Space cancels time and time space, though a time-space continuum of doing-being or a space-time continuum of being-doing are possible and, indeed, inevitable while relativity remains a reality. In the one case, a Social Transcendentalist free binding; in the other case, a Transcendental Socialist bound freedom. The Devil-God/God-Devil ideological alternatives of the foreseeable future (see Appendix).
212. If Schopenhauer can be described as a theosophical philosopher, then it seems to me that I, who stand in an antithetical relationship to him, should be described as a philosophical theosophist. For philosophical theosophy is, after all, the antithesis to theosophical philosophy.
213. Philosophy is not about saying simple things in a complex manner, as certain pseudo-philosophers have erroneously supposed, but about saying complex things as simply and therefore straightforwardly as possible. The philosopher has the difficult task of rendering extremely complicated issues as simply as possible. It is not his business to obfuscate or seek to appear profound. On the contrary, it is his business to reveal the Truth.
214. We need be in no doubt concerning the fact that Schopenhauer was a revolt against bourgeois idealism, or claims for the primacy and supremacy of thought, since he posited will as the supreme and primary factor in life, which he rightly regarded as preceding intellect and, hence, thought. Yet unlike Marx, who also revolted against bourgeois idealism, Schopenhauer effectively did so from an aristocratic point-of-view and thus functioned as a Neo-Platonist, a kind of traditional idealist - as to a lesser extent was Nietzsche, given his 'aristocratic radicalism'. Thus Schopenhauer and Marx may be regarded as having revolted against bourgeois idealism in opposite ways - the former backwards and the latter forwards ... into proletarian materialism. For Schopenhauer, the will was paramount. For Marx, on the contrary, economic factors were the driving force behind historical change, a subject which, in any case, Schopenhauer repudiated. Consequently while Schopenhauer was reactionary, Marx was progressive, taking economic materialism as his starting-point. And, to be sure, dialectical materialism is the only logical starting-point for a progressive, and hence proletarian, revolt against bourgeois idealism. One extreme engenders another. So any philosopher whose work is in the least degree proletarian effectively stems from Marx, rather than from either Hegel or Nietzsche or any of the other bourgeois idealists. It has the People as its starting-point and treats of them in a respectful manner. They are not 'rabble', 'mob', 'poisoners of all wells', etc., as with Nietzsche, but simply proletarians whose oppressive and unfortunate circumstances stem, in no small degree, from bourgeois exploitation, and therefore can only be properly alleviated once that exploitation has been removed from their backs and they are enabled, in consequence, to walk upright - as proud, free-standing men.
215. However, whilst it is incontestable that the proletarian philosopher will maintain a respectful attitude towards the People, it does not follow that he will be a materialist, like Marx, and only think in economic terms. While that may be the most logical starting-point in the revolt against bourgeois idealism, it is anything but the most logical or even desirable finishing-point, since it leaves the religious essence of man out of account - indeed, negates it through its vehement opposition to bourgeois religion, and thus pictures man in his proletarian manifestation as a kind of behavioural machine for whom economic factors are the main, if not sole, determinant of his destiny. Now, doubtless, whilst a blue-collar view of the proletariat will largely confirm one in such a picture (and Marxism is nothing if not a view which conceives of the proletariat as synonymous with industrial workers), it cannot claim to do justice to working-class people who are white collar and therefore more disposed, in their use of intellect or mind, to a religious or, at any rate, idealistic view of life. Consequently, Marxism is largely irrelevant to the white-collar proletariat who, though doubtless suffering from bourgeois exploitation as much as if not more than their blue-collar counterparts, are less materialistic than manual or industrial workers. That is why proletarian philosophy has to evolve towards an idealistic position if justice is to be done to that not-inconsiderable stratum of the working class which is more spiritually conscious, and hence culture-loving, than the Marxian proletariat. For the time has come for proletarian idealism to be voiced, and such an idealism can only be voiced in terms of a proletarian ideology which, contrary to Marxist Communism, has its starting-point in the white-collar proletariat.
216. Yet if proletarian idealism has a starting-point in the white-collar proletariat, it cannot have its end or finishing-point there, since true idealism is more a question of play than of work, and consequently the goal of this idealism must be proletarian play of the most idealistic and, hence, religiously being-oriented order. In other words, the end of proletarian idealism must be play and thus the gradual transmutation of workers into players, with especial reference to spiritual play. For while proletarian idealism has its starting-point in the social, or white-collar, stratum of the People, its end can only be theocratic and accordingly less concerned with social wellbeing than with cultural and, in particular, spiritual fulfilment achieved on the basis of the utmost being-oriented play, thereby confirming its divine bias on both negative, or worker, and positive, or player, terms. Likewise, while proletarian materialism has its starting-point in the blue-collar proletariat and is therefore socialist, it likewise proceeds in the course of time towards a kind of theocratic idealism which is less being orientated than doing orientated, and accordingly of a sports order of play commensurate with blue-collar criteria - a diabolic mode of playing which both contrasts with and provides a positive counterbalance to the diabolic order of work that, in its manual essence, appertains to the industrial proletariat.
217. Thus from being-oriented work to being-oriented play within the divine spectrum of proletarian idealism, and from doing-oriented work to doing-oriented play within the diabolic spectrum of proletarian materialism - the twin poles of God and Devil beyond and above the (bourgeois) world. On the one hand, a Superfatheristic/Superchristic distinction between (proton-wavicle) being-oriented work and (electron-wavicle) being-oriented play, and, on the other hand a Supersatanic/Super-antichristic distinction between (proton-particle) doing-oriented work and (electron-particle) doing-oriented play. Social Transcendentalism in the one case, but Transcendental Socialism in the other case.
218. Of course, such proletarian idealism as is voiced throughout my writings does owe something, if indirectly, to bourgeois idealism, particularly to Schopenhauer (to the extent that he can be classified as a bourgeois idealist), Hegel, Nietzsche, and even Teilhard de Chardin, whose starting-point is rather more Catholic than secular. But there can be no question that, fundamentally, any idealism which is intended for the proletariat comes after Marxian materialism as a revolt against both a blue-collar concept of the proletariat and the concomitant economic determinism which, while largely relevant to the proletariat in question, could only be an insult to that greater proportion of the working class which is white collar or, at any rate, other than industrial. Certainly, late Marxist thinkers like Koestler and Sartre unwittingly undermined proletarian materialism by their subversive repudiation of a variety of traditional communist assumptions about man and society, and therefore indirectly paved the way for the proletarian idealism to follow; though this idealism makes no short-term claim to supplant Communism, as though the age were ripe for universal Centrism! On the contrary, I fully accept the historical value and necessity of Communism for certain countries, since the world cannot be elevated to the Divine overnight, so to speak, but will remain divided between diabolic and divine interests for some time to come ... according to the natures of the various countries, some of which are traditionally more democratic, others of which traditionally more theocratic, neither of which can nor indeed should be forced into the same ideological straitjacket ... contrary to racial factors which, to a significant extent, condition their respective ideological standings. Even Marx spoke rather more in terms of a Germanic version of Communism than of a Slavic version, which, as we all know, had to wait for Lenin to modify Marxism away from the (muscle) body towards the (new-brain) head, in order that quasi-dictatorial criteria, founded upon the need for a vanguard party of the (blue-collar) working class within the framework of a totalitarian State, could come to the fore at the expense of purely Marxist, democratic criteria more suited to the Germanic West, where notions of literal worker ownership, worker management, mass-democratic participation, etc., are especially congenial - at any rate, to those Marxists whose Socialism is inherently materialistic rather than naturalistic, decentralist (in relation to bourgeois centrality) rather than centralist, and democratic rather than theocratic. Anathema to both Western Capitalists and Eastern Communists alike, they find themselves trapped between the Scylla of State Capitalism and the Carybdis of State Socialism, mouthpieces of a uniquely Germanic mode of Communism which, instead of opposing the world from a diabolic standpoint beyond it, stems from the world as the furthermost reach of worldly or, more correctly, anti-worldly materialism.
219. However, if this proletarian materialism is strictly Marxist and, by implication, an ideological precondition of the proletarian naturalism, or State Socialism, advocated by Lenin and upheld by his Asiatic followers, of whom the Chinese must be accounted the principal latter-day exponents, then proletarian naturalism may likewise be regarded as a precondition of my own Social Transcendentalist Centrism, which is both a revolt against and an extension beyond Transcendental Socialism to the extent that, in the one case, it opposes State ownership by Centre trusteeship, and in the other case it advocates a People's theocracy in which the People, with particular reference to the white-collar proletariat, become religiously sovereign ... as, in effect, Holy Spirit, and are thereby empowered to aspire, no matter how indirectly or humbly at first, towards the definitive realization of spiritual unity in the Omega Beyond - an aspiration, so I contend, which would be stepped-up and accordingly rendered more efficacious in the course of millennial time ... as in due course the People were transcended by the successive stages and manifestations of post-human life, as described elsewhere in my writings.
220. Thus Social Transcendentalism is no mere reaction against Transcendental Socialism, like Nazism or Fascism, but an extension beyond and above proletarian naturalism to the divine level of a proletarian idealism, no less supra-national in scope than its diabolic counterpart, though determined to further the cause of People's theocracy throughout the globe in the name of spiritual salvation. For ultimate reality rests neither in the material world nor in the blue-collar proletariat, but in the superconscious mind, which is the starting-point of transcendent heaven, the Superheaven of an electron-wavicle attraction. If bourgeois idealism accorded thought the status of an ultimate reality, then we proletarian idealists must ensure that positive pure spirit is accorded such a status, as it fully deserves.
221. In the wisdom of his old age Sartre believed -
and correctly - that the ultimate society had to be ethical, i.e. concerned
with the transcendent absolute beyond man, and that no such ethical society
could arise except on the basis of freedom, but that no such freedom was
possible until bourgeois power, or the economic ability of the bourgeoisie to
oppress the proletariat, had been abolished.
Like Sartre, I, too, believe that there can be no transcendental ethics
without freedom (from bourgeois oppression), and no freedom until Capitalism
has been overcome. But, unlike him, I go
beyond opposition to capitalist power in my belief that the People must also be
spared power or, at any rate, have political, economic, and judicial power
removed from them, if an ethical aspiration towards the transcendent is duly to
result. For it is not enough that the
People should be freed from bourgeois oppression. They must also be freed from their own power,
if the '
222. In terms of economics, a series of distinctions could be drawn between:-
1. amoral worldly power, or capitalist private ownership;
2. immoral worldly power, or corporate capitalism;
3. immoral diabolic power, or state socialist ownership;
4. moral divine power, or centre trusteeship.
For the basic distinction between moral or amoral and immoral modes of economic power is fundamentally one with regard to the individual, on whose shoulders rests morality, and the collective, which can only be immoral in view of the diffusion of power on a necessarily decentralized (centrifugal) basis, whether we then make a further distinction between the literal implementation of this basis, as in Marxian Socialism, or a sublimated implementation, as in State Socialism. Yet, if both Corporate Capitalism (not to be confused with the first of the above options) and State Socialism are economically immoral because of the collective, and hence diffused, modes of ownership, Private Capitalism, although centralized, is less than moral by dint of the ownership of capital, shares, industry, etc., by a particular individual, who is likely to amass further capital, industry, etc., at other people's expense. Only when industry is transferred to Centre trusteeship and, hence, to an impersonal, institutionalized 'individual', viz. the Centre, can economics approximate to a moral order ... commensurate with divine criteria, in which no ownership is at stake and capital profits accruing to industrial success are used to further the People's interests, with particular emphasis on their spiritual welfare, and thus the furtherance, in effect, of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Centre alone would have true economic power, a power used for the general good rather than (as with private ownership) to further the economic growth of a particular person. Consequently we can speak, overall, of an economic spectrum stretching from amoral realism (private capitalism) to moral idealism (centre trusteeship) via immoral materialism (corporate/state capitalism) and immoral naturalism (state socialism), with worldly and divine individualism flanking worldly and diabolic collectivism respectively - Fascist and Communist modes of economic immorality in between Liberal and Centrist modes of economic morality (Germanic Second Coming and Slavic Antichrist in between Germanic Christ and Celtic Holy Ghost).
223. On balance, Bertrand Russell was less a philosopher than an historian of philosophy, which is a breed of writer antithetical to philosophers of history, such as Toynbee and Spengler. In my opinion, historians of philosophy are no less a superior breed of historian to historians-proper than ... philosophers of history are an inferior breed of philosopher to philosophers-proper. For whereas the former are rather more of the philosophical head than of the historical body, the latter are rather more of the historical body than of the philosophical head. Should Bertrand Russell's name mean anything to future generations, it will be more in consequence of monumental books like A History of Western Philosophy than of the series of slender essayistic volumes - quick to date - which bear many of the hallmarks of a left-liberal homme de lettres, and few if any hallmarks of a systematic philosopher!
224. Revaluation of different kinds of football, viz. eleven-a-side, five-a-side, six-a-side, in relation to ideological equivalents: Democratic Socialist eleven-a-side football played on a grass pitch; pure Socialist eleven-a-side football played on a plastic pitch; Communist five-a-side indoor football; Transcendental Socialist six-a-side indoor football. Thus, further to my previous thoughts on this subject, [See, for instance, From Materialism to Idealism.] I have distinguished between Communist and Transcendental Socialist equivalents on the basis of a five-a-side/six-a-side dichotomy between a type of indoor football which is materialistic, i.e. played all along the ground and therefore absolutist, and a type of indoor football which is comparatively idealistic, i.e. allowing for flighted balls and therefore relativistic - a distinction analogous to our musical dichotomy between soft rock as Communist and jazz-rock as Transcendental Socialist. Thus the addition of a flighted ball possibility to six-a-side football entitles it to be regarded, in my view, as a Transcendental Socialist equivalent beyond the Communist purism of (ground-low) five-a-side football - at least that is one of the principal reasons for considering it in a more idealistic light, a light analogous (to give a further parallel) to that in which we view streamlined motorbikes vis-à-vis plain or conventional motorbikes of a comparatively light-weight (in relation to the larger socialist motorbikes) construction. Doubtless the free-flow of substitutes adds or, rather, confirms an idealistic, i.e. wavicle-biased, dimension to the game, and possibly the existence of the not-inappropriately named 'sin bin' does likewise ... if on Leninist 'theocratic' terms.
225. Considering both types of indoor football in relation to conventional outdoor football, it should be clear that the former are of the head rather than of the body to the extent that the indoor context, having fewer players, signifies a degree of centro-complexification unattainable on an outdoor eleven-a-side basis, and thereby confirms a superior ideological development commensurate with communistic criteria. In a very real sense six-a-side football is the ultimate mode of football, just as Transcendental Socialism is the ultimate mode of Socialism, as superior to Democratic Socialism as the new-brain head to the muscle body. Certainly there is every chance that indoor football will be the football of the future, played long after the outdoor variety has been consigned to the rubbish heap of history. For it alone accords with the diabolic head above the worldly body, and therefore stands in a parallel relation to Fascist basketball on the one hand and to Social Transcendentalist hoopball on the other: five-a-side football a direct parallel to the former and six-a-side football to the latter.
226. To distinguish between outdoor American football as Nazi in a left-wing way and indoor American football as Nazi in a right-wing way, as regarding avant-garde rock on the one hand and avant-garde jazz on the other, both of which are ideologically parallel. Thus American football may be said to stand in an ideologically superior light to conventional outdoor football, whether Democratic Socialist or pure Socialist, but in an ideologically inferior light to basketball, which succeeds it, so to speak, on the basis of a properly theocratic parallel to Communist five-a-side football (see above). As to the possibility of an Ecological equivalent in between Fascist basketball and Communist five-a-side football, I should like to posit team handball as the most credible candidate for this position, since the term 'handball' suggests a midway-point in between materialistic football and idealistic basketball, and Ecological equivalents are nothing if not midway between one theocratic extreme and another. Granted that we derive the materialistic status of football largely from the fact that, in relation to hands or head, feet are the lowest-common-denominator and therefore balls which proceed along the ground in consequence of having been kicked or passed can only be regarded in a materialistic light, correlative with Socialism, by contrast to those which are thrown through the air or passed from hand to hand, then it must follow that the idealistic status of basketball owes not a little to the transcendentalism of the term 'basket', which has nothing whatsoever to do with any part of the body (any more than does the hoop of hoopball), since an artificial phenomenon quite distinct from hands or feet. Now if basketball corresponds to a Fascist equivalent on account of both the transcendentalism of the basket and the hands-high method of play, and indoor football corresponds to a Communist equivalent on account of the foot-low method of play which is confirmed by the term 'football', then it needn't surprise us if handball corresponds to an Ecological equivalent in between these theocratic alternatives on account of the midway status of the 'hand' in relation to the 'foot' in the one case and to the 'basket' in the other - a status confirming a relatively realistic position vis-à-vis basket-high idealism and foot-low materialism. Such a realistic, or as I should say in regard to this level of sport, superrealistic position is commensurate with an Ecological equivalent - a superrealism lying in-between superidealistic and supermaterialistic positions ... commensurate with Fascist and Communist ideological equivalents respectively, as, to a lesser degree, with their Social Transcendentalist (hoopball) and Transcendental Socialist (six-a-side football) extrapolations.
227. When we speak of a 'good ball' in relation to football, we generally mean an accurate or skilful pass from one player to another, whereas a 'bad ball' implies just the opposite, i.e. that one of the players has given the ball away to the opposition through a careless or foolish pass. Consequently the expressions have nothing whatsoever to do with the nature of the ball itself, which does not enter into account. Yet balls can also be good or bad, depending on their construction, that is to say, whether they conform to the specifications of the game and are accordingly of the correct size, shape, weight, material, etc, or whether, on the contrary, something is amiss with one or more of these factors. Thus we distinguish a good ball from a bad ball in terms of physical factors, which contrasts to our way of distinguishing, within the context of an actual football match, between a 'good ball' and a 'bad ball', as applicable to the standard of play. Clearly, whereas criteria applying to the actual construction of the ball are physical, those which apply to the way the ball is played are metaphysical, and consequently we have a distinction between the ball itself and what is done with it during the course of play - a distinction, in other words, between the phenomenal and the noumenal or, as we should be saying in connection with such a comparatively advanced and artificial game as football, the superphenomenal ball and the supernoumenal pass, the latter of which is only possible on account of the prior existence of the former, which may accordingly be described as its material precondition. One could argue, in Hegelian terms, that whereas the ball itself is a manifestation of the world, the play resulting from its use, whether for good or bad, is a manifestation of Spirit in the world at that particular level of its unfolding.
228. For a writer, technique is a kind of bridge between style and theme, a worldly link between appearance and essence. The more apparent the style, the less essential the theme and, conversely, the more essential the theme, the less apparent the style. The simplest and most alpha-stemming writing will be the most stylistic; the profoundest and most omega-oriented writing, by contrast, the most thematic. In between will come worldly, or bourgeois, writing, which strives to achieve a balance between style and content, appearance and essence. Now whether this balance is effectively with regard to the Father and the Holy Spirit, or Satan and the Antichrist, or indeed worldly alpha and worldly omega options ... will depend on the kind of writer in question, which is to say, whether a writer primarily concerned with the pursuit of truth, like a philosopher; or one primarily concerned with the pursuit of beauty, like a poet; or one whose primary concern is with the pursuit of strength, like a playwright; or one whose primary concern is with the pursuit of goodness, like a novelist. For each different type of writer correlates with a different spectrum, and no two spectra have the same stylistic or thematic extremes. To distinguish style from content on the basis of beauty or truth alone would be to misrepresent the issue, since these quantities pertain to different spectra and could only be inferred to co-exist in writers who were neither divine nor diabolic but a paradoxical cross between the two, like philosophical poets or poetic philosophers. As to those who are less mongrels than thoroughbreds, we must allow for a false style no less than a true theme, an ugly style no less than a beautiful theme, a weak style no less than a strong theme, or an evil style no less than a good theme, depending on the type of writer, viz. philosopher, poet, playwright, or novelist, in question.
229. Just as there was a pre-historical time of doing-oriented chaos before historical chronologies were compiled, so there will be a post-historical time or, rather, eternity of being-oriented order, in which the study of history or the making of chronologies will be taboo, since beneath the pale. For history is only relevant to an open society, not to one which, like the post-historical eternity I have in mind, will be so omega orientated as to be indisposed to looking back over its shoulder, so to speak, at the doings - for the most part sordid - of the past. In a truly omega-oriented closed society, history would be as much beneath the pale as it was once beyond the pale of the most alpha-stemming closed societies. For history is the Becoming, not the Become (being).
230. As a rule, worldly societies, whether autocratic or democratic, are matriarchal, whereas diabolic and divine societies, by contrast, are patriarchal. For whereas the body is of the world, the head is either of Heaven or Hell above the world, depending on whether a mind or a brain bias is upheld in and by any given divine or diabolic society. Because woman more accords, traditionally, with the worldly body than with either the divine or the diabolic head, being, to all intents and purposes, akin to a planet vis-à-vis the sun and stars (the sun more conspicuous than the stars on account of its correlation with husbands and fathers ... as previously discussed), we should have no hesitation in regarding a worldly, and hence feminine society, as matriarchal ... in contrast to pre- and post-worldly patriarchal societies, which accord with the head on either subconscious/old-brain terms in the former case or new-brain/superconscious terms in the latter case - the divine (mind) level rather more archpatriarchal than patriarchal. As yet, however, we haven't witnessed a post-worldly divine society, since that is germane, so far as I am concerned, to Social Transcendentalism and, hence, to ideological futurity. But we have ample evidence of post-worldly diabolic societies, especially in regard to the Communist East, and they are nothing if not patriarchal, with male leaders in both presidential and ministerial posts - leaders who would be unwilling to share power with women. How different is the People's Republic of China, in this respect, from Western countries like Great Britain, a quintessentially worldly democracy in which not only has a woman been elected Prime Minister on three successive occasions but ... co-existed with a female monarch who has been on the throne even longer than her indefatigable Prime Minister was in parliament! Thus at both autocratic and democratic poles of this worldly society women have been in power, thereby confirming its matriarchal nature. Indeed, it is scarcely surprising that two of the three most esteemed monarchs in English history have been women - namely Queen Elizabeth I and Queen Victoria, and probably it is no mere coincidence that their respective reigns marked cultural and imperial highpoints in English history. It was only during the Cromwellian revolution that anything resembling a democratic patriarchy existed, while Henry VIII would be the most credible candidate for an autocratic one - a sort of medieval patriarch who is better remembered, in the popular imagination, for his eight wives than for his political achievements.
231. What especially limits languages like French
and German to a bourgeois, worldly status is their division into feminine and
masculine gender, which ensures a dualistic balance at the expense of a
transcendent or genderless one-sidedness.
In other words, a worldly relativity as opposed to a
post-worldly absolutism, the very factor which makes for a bourgeois view of
life. For it cannot be denied
that language to some extent conditions one's psychology, and regular use of
languages balanced between feminine and masculine genders can hardly fail to
elicit complacency in dualistic norms - short of one's rebelling against such
languages in favour of one which, like English, is genderless and therefore
more extreme in character. Certainly the
Creole language of the island of Reunion is considerably less dualistic than
French, having but three feminine nouns, viz. la pic
(the mountain peak), la tunnel (the tunnel), and la sable (the
sand), which, ironically, are all masculine in French. Could it be, I wonder, that the Creole
232. One of the most controversial issues for the
Church, particularly the Protestant one, in the late-twentieth century was the
ordination of women priests, which some saw as a necessary advance towards
complete equality of the sexes and others, evidently more conservative,
regarded with deep suspicion ... as something that flew in the face of
Christian tradition. My own position on
this issue has recently become clearer, so I shall here set it down for the
philosophical record, irrespective of my ideological opposition to the Church,
particularly in its Protestant manifestation, and professed adherence to Social
Transcendentalism. Not altogether
surprisingly, it is the Catholic Church which most opposes the concept of women
priests, and quite logically too, since Catholicism is much more an idealistic
mode of Christianity than Protestantism, more - to revert to my customary
metaphors - a church of the head (mind) than one of the body, given its Latin
origins and, in the main, following.
(For it is only in the Germanic countries that bodily Christianity, or
Protestantism, has traditionally flourished.)
Thus where the head rules, the head decides, and masculine criteria
accordingly prevail. Where the body
rules, on the other hand, such criteria, while nominally upheld, are less
unassailable - indeed, can and have been subverted to suit the climate of the
age. Now since the present age is highly
decadent insofar as the Germanic West is concerned, it can be of no surprise to
us if liberal tendencies of the sort we are discussing make an appearance in
the Church to usher in a new era or, more correctly, a further manifestation of
the general decadence in which, effectively, the bodily phenomenon of women
priests has its day. For let there be no
doubt on this issue: women priests are only credible in a bodily Church whose
decadence is so far advanced ... as to warrant female salvation from the socialistic
and/or communistic damnation which not only lies in wait beyond the boundaries
of the Christian West, but threatens the Church from within, to the ultimate
detriment of women themselves! Thus, as
in other comparable worldly contexts where middle-class women have been called
in or, rather, have called themselves in to heal the breach and shore-up the
tottering edifice of worldly civilization, the
233. But let us now take a countervailing argument which, though essentially irrelevant in this context, can be formulated on the basis of sexual equality between men and women. For if women are prepared to do the same things as men, why shouldn't they be allowed to, providing they can do them just as well? Isn't sexual equality a contemporary ideal, and therefore doesn't the ordination of women priests confirm that the ideal is being realized? Superficially it does. But, judged by more exacting standards, can the sort of women who want to become priests be regarded as quasi-Supermen in relation, officially or unofficially, to masculine Supermen and, consequently, as deserving of real equality? And the answer to this question has to be 'no'. A middle-class woman can never be the real equal of a middle-class man, since bourgeois heterosexuality, confirmed by unequal sartorial customs, precludes unisexual equality between men and women, keeping the latter in a relatively inferior position vis-à-vis the former. Now since the Church, especially in its Protestant manifestation, is nothing if not middle class, there can be no equality in the sense that proletarian women, who both dress and appear masculine, achieve equality with proletarian men on a quasi-Superman/Superman basis. Rather, one will have a heterosexual inequality between men and women, and such an inequality can only result, in the event of women being ordained, in a neo-autocratic materialism in which, effectively, priestesses seek to replace priests as the most credible representatives of bodily Christianity in a radically decadent age. Now to the extent that certain male priests may no longer appear quite so credible, for one reason or another, regarding this purpose, female priests would have a limited justification, albeit not one that could outlive the eclipse of Western civilization.
234. When a religion is worldly, like Christianity,
Heaven is otherworldly and only arrived at, if at all, following death. When, on the other hand, a religion is
transcendental, Heaven is in the world and can be arrived at through
self-realization ... in successive stages of spiritual centro-complexification. Heaven for the former is without. For the latter it is within. Christ taught the '